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 Introduction 
Human Rights and Legal Pluralism: 
Four Research Agendas 
 GISELLE  CORRADI 1 
 OVER THE PAST two decades, scholarly endeavours to understand social and cultural diversity in relation to human rights have shifted from concerns over universalism and relativism towards the analysis 
of how human rights operate in different contexts, and with which effects. 
A number of reasons explain this. In the fi rst place, one could say that the 
sharpest edges of the so-called  ‘ universality debate ’ have been polished. On 
the one hand, human rights scholars have advanced critical approaches to 
universality (An-Na ’ im 1995; Bell et al 2001; Brems 2001; Donnelly 2007, 
1984). Rather than a priori given, the universal legitimacy of human rights 
may be constructed a posteriori. Since human rights standards are fl exible 
and evolve, they can become responsive to diverse realities. For example, 
existing rights may acquire novel interpretations and new rights may be 
endorsed (Brems 2001). On the other hand, anthropologists have dismissed 
reifi ed conceptions of culture that portray it as static, consensual and self-
contained (Cowen et al 2001; Merry 1998, 2003; Preis 1996; Wilson 1997). 
Both material and immaterial aspects of culture, such as practices, hab-
its, symbols and systems of meaning, have been shown to be reproduced, 
modifi ed, acquired and rejected within histories of contact and exchange, 
embedded in relationships of unequal power. 2 Current anthropological 
understandings of culture recognise its structuring and agentic dimensions, 
while underscoring its changing, contested and porous character. This dynamic 
view of culture and human rights has recast the  ‘ universality debate ’ . 
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 3  For example, Englund documents how a narrow approach to human rights in terms of 
freedom impedes the struggle against poverty and injustice in Malawi (Englund 2006). In the 
area of gender, see Henquinet in this volume. 
 4  Theoretically, this interrogation rests on what Eckert et al have called  ‘ the two sides of the 
sociality of law ’ , ie law ’ s formative impact of the social, and its very constitution in the social 
(Eckert et al 2012: 1). 
Although it is possible that tension exists between aspects of cultural tradi-
tions and certain standards, or even the entire idea of (human) rights, this 
perspective allows us to focus on diachronic processes of co-constitution 
and change (Merry 1997, 2003, 2010). In addition, a number of scholars 
have refl ected on how areas of tension could be resolved. They propose 
intercultural dialogues as means to redefi ne culture and human rights, and 
consider how epistemological bias and power differentials across and within 
social groups interplay with these undertakings (An-Na ’ im 1995; Eberhard 
2002; Santos De Sousa 2002). 
 But next to these theoretical advancements, an empirical reality has 
prompted scholars to reorient their lines of enquiry. By the late 1990s, it 
was clear that human rights had become a global language for the artic-
ulation of a wide range of social struggles the world over. This inspired 
a wave of studies of the  ‘ social life ’ of human rights (Cowan et al 2001; 
Englund 2006; Goodale 2009; Goodale and Merry 2007; Merry 2006a; 
Speed 2007; Wilson 1997; Wilson and Mitchell 2003). By inspecting the 
ways in which human rights become platforms for action, these detailed, 
often ethnographic, accounts of how human rights are mobilised in spe-
cifi c situations demonstrate that a broad spectrum of actors linked through 
trans-local networks are involved in the sociocultural production of human 
rights (Goodale 2007). From this viewpoint, UN monitoring bodies and 
human rights courts produce human rights discourses and practices as 
much as peasant intellectuals and the team members of development pro-
jects debating human rights in rural villages. These studies show that the 
meanings attached to human rights vary and do not necessarily correspond 
with the letter of the law. For example, Goldstein has identifi ed discourses 
on the human right to security in Bolivia that are violent and at odds with 
international law (Goldstein 2007). In other words, which sources inform 
these multi-vocal and multi-sited human rights discourses and practices, and 
which role human rights law plays therein, are matters of empirical inves-
tigation. In this context, the extent to which this pluralising human rights 
landscape enables or constrains processes of emancipation remains a central 
question. 3 
 In this volume, we interrogate how human rights law and practice acquire 
meaning in contexts of legal pluralism, and infl uence interactions that are 
subject to regulation by more than one normative regime. 4 Legal plural-
ism refers to the coexistence of more than one legal order in a particular 
fi eld of social relations (Griffi ths 1986; Merry 1988; Von Benda-Beckmann 
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 5  We are not concerned with making a contribution to theoretical debates about which 
social phenomena should be labelled  ‘ law ’ (see eg Tamanaha 1993, 2000). Our interest lies in 
understanding the variety of norms and disputing institutions that characterise the contexts in 
which human rights operate. Therefore, throughout the volume, the terms  ‘ law ’ or  ‘ legal ’ and 
 ‘ norm ’ or  ‘ normative ’ are used interchangeably. 
 6  There may be no equivalence between these two realms. For example, in many countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa, state courts may handle cases according to customary law, and chiefs may 
combine custom and state law when processing disputes. 
 7  For example, see Weilenmann (2009) on  ‘ project law ’ produced by development agencies. 
 8  See, for example, the contributions of Brems and Desmet in this volume. 
2002; Woodman 1998). 5 The concept denotes a plurality of laws and/or 
mechanisms for processing disputes stemming from different sources of 
legitimation, such as the state, religion or custom, which operate within a 
same sociopolitical, temporal and geographical space. 6 In the Global South, 
legal pluralism is often offi cially endorsed by state policies, and is mainly, 
although not exclusively, linked to customary and religious legal orders oper-
ating alongside the legal institutions inherited from former colonial powers 
(Merry 1988). 7 In the Global North, it is mostly unoffi cial and relates to the 
coexistence of state and non-state forms of ordering, increasingly prevalent 
due to migration and intensifi ed transnational relations (Hellum et al 2011; 
Von Benda-Beckmann et al 2005). As a result, legal pluralism constitutes an 
important element of the contexts in which human rights operate. More-
over, a legal pluralist perspective on the polycentric production and imple-
mentation of human rights law sheds light on how different users of human 
rights law relate to its many layers. 8 
 As in the case of human rights, legal pluralism also has a  ‘ legal ’ and a 
 ‘ social ’ face, or what we would call normative and empirical dimensions. 
At the normative level, legal pluralism constitutes a policy fi eld embodied 
in legislation and case law stipulating how the coexistence of different legal 
orders should function. These policy frameworks may deal with the status 
of different legal orders or elements thereof, and their interfaces. For exam-
ple, they may mandate, make optional or prohibit that customary, religious 
or state laws are applied in certain domains. They may also regulate the 
judicial competence of different authorities and the possibility to appeal 
from one jurisdiction to another (Connolly 2005; Forsyth 2007; Morse 
and Woodman 1987). When policies take a  ‘ positive ’ stance towards legal 
pluralism, ie non-state legal orders are not criminalised or ignored, they 
may dictate that state courts apply non-state laws, that non-state disputing 
forums are integrated into the state court hierarchy, or that non-state laws 
and disputing mechanisms are applicable but remain autonomous from 
the state judiciary. The latter may entail or not that the decisions of these 
forums can be enforced by recourse to state mechanisms of coercion (ibid). 
 Empirically, or as a social phenomenon, legal pluralism denotes the de 
facto ways in which a multiplicity of legal orders operate and articulate with 
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 9  For example, being a rights-bearing subject that is assertive in denouncing gender violence 
is incompatible with being  ‘ a good wife ’ who accepts this violence as a natural, regrettable fact 
of life (Merry 2006: 186). 
 10  Legal consciousness refers to the ways in which people use and understand the law, which 
is closely connected to their experiences with it (Merry 1990: 5). 
each other in a given space. This may be more or less infl uenced by poli-
cies on legal pluralism. Classical empirical studies of legal pluralism reveal 
the co-constitutive dynamics among coexisting forms of ordering (Gal-
anter 1981; Merry 1988; Moore 1973; Von Benda-Beckmann 1981). In her 
infl uential article,  ‘ Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study ’ , Moore introduced the notion 
that social fi elds have rule-making capacities and the means to induce or 
coerce compliance, while they are also part of a larger social matrix that 
invades and affects their operation (Moore 1973). In other words, the regu-
lation of social fi elds results from intended and unintended intersections 
amongst normative orders. The concept  ‘ inter-legality ’ mirrors this idea 
from an actor perspective (Santos De Sousa, 2002). Since the life of most 
people takes place at the crossroads of multiple regulatory regimes,  ‘ a mix-
ture and interpenetration of elements from different legal orders arises both 
in our minds and in our actions. Consequently, social practice is a constant 
bridging between legal orders ’ (Santos 2002: 437). However, in some cases, 
different legal orders sanction forms of subjectivity that are diffi cult to rec-
oncile. Merry employs the term  ‘ double consciousness ’ regarding situations 
in which people move in between normative frameworks that produce dis-
parate understandings of the self (Merry 2006a: 179 – 217). 9 Processes of 
exposure to and mobilisation of multiple registers of law affect the legal 
consciousness of individuals in unpredictable ways. 10 In turn, this may lead 
to the emergency of new  ‘ hybrid ’ legal institutions, entrench  ‘ old ways ’ or 
produce changes in existing legal orders (Eckert et al 2014; Merry 2010). 
Studies of legal pluralism as a social phenomenon seek to capture these 
dynamics. 
 In this collection of essays, we explore how the legal and social dimensions 
of legal pluralism interplay with the legal and social life of human rights. 
Consequently, the relationship between human rights and legal pluralism is 
investigated at four levels of analysis: normative legal pluralism and human 
rights law, human rights law and empirical legal pluralism, empirical legal 
pluralism and human rights practice, and human rights practice and nor-
mative legal pluralism. By distinguishing these sub-fi elds, we hope to con-
tribute to the development of a fertile ground for enriched exchange across 
disciplinary boundaries. Misunderstandings, particularly between legal and 
social science scholars, may easily stem from implicit differences in the use 
of the concepts  ‘ human rights ’ and  ‘ legal pluralism ’ . For example, social 
scientists may question the usefulness of debating whether legal pluralism 
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is  ‘ good ’ or  ‘ bad ’ , since it is a fact. This may preclude a discussion on how 
different policies on legal pluralism affect human rights. Furthermore, this 
fourfold framework allows us to situate existing knowledge and the insights 
that emerge from the contributions in this volume within more specifi c, and 
sometimes quite disparate, research agendas. At the same time, we acknowl-
edge the need to understand the connections between empirical and norma-
tive theory, and build bridges between the multiple scholarly projects that 
are conducted under the umbrella of  ‘ human rights and legal pluralism ’ . 
The present volume refl ects our commitment to generating such encounters. 
 1. NORMATIVE LEGAL PLURALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 Studying the relationship between policies on legal pluralism and human 
rights law entails two sets of questions. On the one hand, how should states 
respond to legal pluralism according to human rights law ? Does human 
rights law recognise a right to  ‘ one ’ s own law ’ ? Are there particular poli-
cies on legal pluralism that are prohibited, permitted or mandatory accord-
ing to international standards ? And on the other hand, how should states 
respond to legal pluralism in order to protect human rights ? Which specifi c 
legislation and case law enable or constrain this protection ? Refl ections on 
the second set of questions have sometimes crystallised in the adoption of 
international standards, and international standards or their interpretation 
may be subject to criticism and debate, so both levels of enquiry are con-
nected. As demonstrated by Brems in  chapter 2 , human rights law is not that 
coherent when it comes to legal pluralism. And although it contains some 
guidance on the treatment of legal pluralism, it also presents many gaps 
(ICHRP 2009; Quane 2013). 
 At present, the status of  ‘ the right to legal pluralism ’ in human rights law 
is ambivalent. While there is no universal right to  ‘ one ’ s own law ’ , in some 
cases legal pluralism is mandatory, in others it is permissible, and yet in 
others it is prohibited (Brems in this volume; Megret 2012; Quane 2013). 
In the second chapter of this volume, Brems demonstrates that when look-
ing at human rights law from an integrated perspective, this state of affairs 
is problematic. It means that states may fi nd themselves in a double bind. 
One branch of human rights law, ie the regime governing the rights of indig-
enous peoples, makes the recognition of legal pluralism mandatory, whereas 
another branch of human rights law, ie the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, forbids it as a violation of human rights. Since both duties 
may apply to the same state simultaneously, this inconsistency is untenable. 
 In this context, a fundamental question is why adopting a policy of 
endorsement of legal pluralism would be desirable or undesirable from 
the perspective of human rights. This interrogation is part of more gen-
eral debates about how states should respond to legal diversity as an aspect 
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 11  For the moment, the case law of the Inter-American Court relies on culture and identity 
as the basis for this recognition, eg  Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay ( 2006 ) , 
 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador ( 2012 ) ,  Kuna Indigenous People of Madun-
gand í and the Ember á Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v Panama ( 2014 ) . 
However, there is no reason to assume that culture and identity should be the only grounds to 
protect collective property. 
of cultural diversity, and promote social cohesion in multicultural socie-
ties (Megret 2012). In this regard, two issues are of concern. First, that the 
imposition of a unitary system of law may not be neutral, but refl ect the 
particular viewpoint of hegemonic groups to the exclusion of those that are 
marginalised. And second, that granting offi cial status to legal orders asso-
ciated with marginalised groups could entrench power inequalities within 
those groups, resulting in the exclusion of minorities within the minority. 
In other words, the adoption of policies that endorse legal pluralism may 
advance the collective rights of minorities, but may also entail the risk of 
violating the individual rights of their members. Some scholars have sug-
gested that we look beyond this frame of reasoning, and consider instead 
whether the recognition of multiple legal orders may be benefi cial for soci-
ety at large (Ardito 1997; Megret 2012). In other words, in multicultural 
settings, the endorsement of legal pluralism not only concerns minorities, 
but raises questions on how to capitalise on diversity and strengthen democ-
racy in general (ibid). 
 The conclusions of Gomez Isa and Corradi in  chapters 4 and 6 reso-
nate with this view. These chapters show how the interpretation of human 
rights may be enriched by the inclusion of voices that have been largely 
excluded from the defi nition of these standards. Gomez Isa illustrates how 
indigenous relationships with a territory have become the platform for a 
renewed interpretation of the right to property under the Inter-American 
system for the protection of human rights. In recognition of indigenous legal 
orders, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights extended the scope of 
this right to protect not only individual, but also collective property. Con-
sidering the socioeconomic realities of Latin America, it is not unthinkable 
that this broader interpretation of the right to property may not only benefi t 
indigenous peoples, but also other groups with collective claims to land. 11 
Similarly, Corradi ’ s analysis of how the right to a fair trial may be inter-
preted cross-culturally suggests that areas of tension between indigenous 
procedural norms and mainstream interpretations of this right may open 
windows of opportunity for exchange and collaboration between state and 
indigenous authorities, which may strengthen both indigenous and state 
legal orders. 
 At the same time, the human rights implications of policies that endorse 
legal pluralism depend on the concrete substance of these policies. For 
example, how is the enjoyment of human rights affected by different nor-
mative orders and disputing forums being declared mandatory or optional 
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and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007). 
 13  See Quane (2013) for an extensive discussion of this duty. 
 14  Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others  (CCT 49/03) [ 2004 ] . 
for different persons in different fi elds ? Human rights law does not contain 
ultimate answers to these questions. According to the UN Human Rights 
Committee, when states recognise the judicial functions of customary or 
religious courts they need to ensure that these courts cannot hand down 
binding judgments unless the proceedings are limited to minor civil and 
criminal matters, meet the basic requirements of fair trial, ensure equal 
treatment, are validated by the state in the light of human rights and can 
be challenged in a state court. 12 But apart from these guidelines, states can 
decide according to their discretion. This is not wholly surprising. After all, 
the human rights effects of particular policies on legal pluralism are diffi cult to 
evaluate in the abstract. This means that these questions remain contested and 
their answers highly contingent upon empirical realities (ICHRP 2009: 92). 
Sieder and McNeish note the importance of looking at the legacies of 
 different colonial and postcolonial histories, and how these shaped current 
constellations of power and governance (Sieder and McNeish 2013: 4 – 7). 
In regions such as Latin America, where indigenous forms of justice were 
either criminalised or ignored by the postcolonial state, the recent adoption 
of policies that give offi cial status to indigenous law is celebrated as the 
result of a long struggle for emancipation. By contrast, in most of sub- 
Saharan Africa, colonial and postcolonial policies on legal pluralism 
sought to co-opt customary law institutions as instruments of domination. 
 Therefore, the offi cial status of customary legal orders may not convey pro-
gressive connotations, and is often met with suspicion (ibid). Bearing this in 
mind, a crucial issue is the extent to which policies endorsing legal pluralism 
foresee mechanisms of downwards accountability that keep the power of 
legal institutions in check (Nyamu-Musembi 2000; ICHRP 2009). 
 In this respect, human rights law does demand that states ensure that 
international standards apply to offi cial non-state legal orders. 13 This is the 
case in several postcolonial countries, where customary legal orders are rec-
ognised by the state, except for when they breach human rights. For exam-
ple, in the famous case  Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha , the South African 
Constitutional Court ruled that the customary law rule of male primogeni-
ture could not be endorsed because it was incompatible with the rights to 
equality and dignity enshrined in the Bill of Rights. 14 In contrast, in Sierra 
Leone and Lesotho, customary laws are offi cially applicable but exempted 
from the constitutional prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gen-
der. This results in the legalisation of discrimination against women who 
fall under the jurisdiction of customary law (Odinkalu 2006: 155; Nyamu-
Musembi 2000). In addition, human rights soft law recommends that states 
8  Giselle Corradi
 15  See Quane (2013: fns 102 and 103) for numerous examples of such recommendations by 
UN human rights treaty bodies and independent experts established within the UN Charter-
based system. 
 16  For the moment, only norms of customary international law concerned with crimes that 
entail massive violations of human rights apply directly to non-state actors (eg genocide, war 
take positive measures so that non-state legal orders comply with human 
rights 15 — for example, by reinterpreting non-state laws in line with interna-
tional standards, providing human rights training to authorities in non-state 
courts, and adopting a participatory and inclusive process of law reform 
(ibid). A key concern here is whether these policies see non-state and human 
rights law as inherently incompatible or as reconcilable (Perry 2011). As 
discussed above, to a large extent this depends on how human rights and 
culture are conceptualised. However, in the fi nal analysis, the potential of 
policies on legal pluralism to advance or constrain the enjoyment of human 
rights hinges on the actual infl uence of these policies on the ground. This 
brings us to the study of empirical realities and legal pluralism as a social 
phenomenon. 
 2. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND EMPIRICAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 The connection between human rights law and legal pluralism as a social 
phenomenon may be examined from the following two points of view. First, 
which actors and normative frameworks regulate in practice the social fi elds 
in which international standards are applicable ? How can international 
human rights law come to grips with realities of plural regulation and mul-
tidimensional power ? And second, to which extent are the norms and prac-
tices sustained by plural forms of ordering aligned with standards of human 
rights ? This last question may involve assessments of the appropriate inter-
pretation of these standards in the light of legal and cultural diversity. 
 The fi rst question revolves around the issue of where power resides, and 
hence, the ability to violate or realise human rights. International human 
rights law is primarily concerned with the behaviour of states. By observing 
how social fi elds are regulated in practice, empirical studies of legal plural-
ism may question the assumption that the state is the most infl uential agent 
(Provost and Sheppard 2013: 2, 3). The limits of the state-centred architec-
ture of international human rights law have already been exposed from other 
angles. Studies have shown that state sovereignty is increasingly fragmented 
and linked to complex interfaces between global, national and local scales 
of governance (Eilenberg 2014; Peluso and Lund 2011). In this context, 
scholars have examined whether and how international human rights law 
could impose direct obligations upon transnational non-state actors, such as 
corporations and international organisations (Clapham 2013; Vandenhole 
2015; Noortmann et al 2015). 16 Although most international human rights 
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crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery and complicity with state-sponsored abuses). Under 
the existing soft law, ie the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights endorsed by 
the Human Rights Council by resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2011, businesses ’ legal liability for 
human rights violations arises at the national level. 
 17  See, for example, the 2011 special issue of the  Journal of Legal Pluralism on  ‘ Legal Plural-
ism and International Development Interventions ’ ,  Journal of Legal Pluralism , vol 43, issue 63. 
 18  Under international human rights law, state obligations in respect of these actors ’ 
 behaviour differ depending on whether these actors are considered state agents or not. In 
the former case, such as when state policies on legal pluralism grant jurisdictional powers to 
non-state disputing forums, human rights violations committed by these forums are directly 
attributable to the state, which has the duty to take measures in order to ensure that its agents 
respect, protect and fulfi l human rights. In the latter case, state obligations are limited to taking 
ex ante and ex post measures to protect individuals for human rights violation committed by 
third parties. 
law mechanisms continue to focus on states ’ behaviour, initiatives such as 
the UN Global Compact constitute a step in this direction. 
 Empirical studies of legal pluralism may further inform ongoing refl ec-
tions on the reach and limits of the Westphalian architecture of international 
human rights law. On the one hand, these studies show that state institutions 
may be absent, share or compete with other regulatory sources in different 
arenas. 17 This may concern an entire geographical space, as it is often the 
case in confl ict, postconfl ict and some developing regions, but it may also 
apply to specifi c domains of social interaction in all societies. By uncovering 
 ‘ the state of the state ’ and explaining the reasons behind particular confi gu-
rations of plural regulation, these studies may provide elements to appraise 
the ability and willingness of states to protect individuals and entities under 
their jurisdiction for human rights violations committed by non-state actors. 
On the other hand, these studies bring to our attention non-state actors with 
governance capacities at the intra-state level, such as chiefs, indigenous and 
religious leaders, that have rarely been considered in these discussions. 18 
These studies increase our understanding of the sources and nature of these 
actors ’ power. As demonstrated by Hellum and Katsande in  chapter 7 and 
by Henquinet in  chapter 8 , in the context of neoliberal policies and the 
downsizing or retreat of the state from certain public domains, the infl uence 
of customary and religious authorities may derive from or be strengthened 
by alliances with transnational actors, such as private businesses and trans-
national aid organisations. In addition, these chapters uncover the spaces 
in which different forms of power are exercised, enabling or constraining 
the implementation of human rights. Hellum and Katsande discuss how 
women ’ s options to challenge discriminatory customary laws opened and 
closed in a changing political terrain in Zimbabwe. They indicate that the 
 ‘ hidden power ’ exercised by traditional institutions and the  ‘ invisible power ’ 
embedded in social and religious structures that upheld patriarchal percep-
tions and practices dominated over the  ‘ visible power ’ of state laws granting 
equal inheritance rights to men and women. Although Henquinet ’ s chapter 
does not refer explicitly to these different dimensions of power, her study 
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 19  On the cross-cultural examination of corporal punishments, see also An-Na ’ im (1995). 
of transnational women ’ s rights interventions in Niger also exemplifi es how 
the hidden and invisible power of religious networks moulded the scope 
of these interventions, preventing the incorporation of certain international 
standards into national legislation. All these insights point to the need to 
continue to think critically about the way in which human rights law under-
stands power and devices mechanisms to contain it. 
 Regarding the second entry point to research in this sub-fi eld, ie the extent 
to which these confi gurations of plural regulation uphold or violate human 
rights, two sub-questions may be distinguished. Firstly, whether the sub-
stantive, procedural and structural elements of different legal orders abide 
by human rights law. For example, to what extent are existing normative 
orders attuned with these standards ? Are the decisions made within dif-
ferent disputing institutions aligned with human rights ? The same applies 
to the procedures and structural aspects of different disputing forums. A 
considerable amount of research entitled  ‘ human rights and legal pluralism ’ 
concerns precisely these questions (eg Danish Institute for Human Rights 
2013; Farran 2006; Fluet et al 2006; Oppermann 2006; Wojkowska 2006). 
As discussed before, these assessments are not straightforward but depend 
on how human rights and non-state norms are interpreted. 
 Chapters 3 – 6 in this book suggest that disputes occurring at the intersec-
tion of legal orders represent potential spaces of intercultural dialogue that 
may result in the reinterpretation of international standards. The contri-
butions by Desmet and Gomez Isa in  chapters 3 and 4 analyse how these 
standards acquired new meaning informed by indigenous legal orders. They 
show, however, that the overlap is never complete. Even in cases of  ‘ alliance ’ 
between human rights and indigenous norms, such as in the area of rights 
to territory, these encounters may also refl ect tension. In  chapters 5 and 6, 
Hoekema and Corradi deal with how indigenous legal orders call for fl ex-
ibility in the interpretation of certain standards. In  chapter 5 , Hoekema pro-
vides examples regarding the right not to be subjected to cruel and inhuman 
forms of treatment. 19 Amongst others, he describes how the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia came to the decision that corporal punishments applied 
by indigenous justice did not violate this right because the indigenous com-
munity that applied them saw them as a form of cleansing. In  chapter 6 , 
Corradi explores how different modes of processing disputes (eg mediation 
v adjudication) underpinned by different forms of social organisation (eg 
simplex v multiplex societies) infl uence how certain elements of the right to 
a fair trial may be interpreted. As these chapters show, cultural essentialism 
always looms in this line of enquiry. One way to mitigate it is by question-
ing the effects of declaring particular interpretations of norms and practices 
compatible with human rights. 
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 20  She distinguishes between two sub-types:  ‘ replication ’ and  ‘ hybridisation ’ . In the former, 
the transnational idea remains the same but it is framed in a language that is locally familiar. 
 A second sub-question in this area is how the articulation between differ-
ent disputing institutions affects the enjoyment of human rights. For example, 
standards of fair trial such as  ne bis in idem would be breached if the same 
person or entity was punished twice for the same offence, eg fi rst by state 
courts and then by non-state courts or vice versa. Alternatively, the treatment 
of a case by multiple disputing forums at the same level may lead to contra-
dictory outcomes, non-implementation of decisions, impunity and lack of 
accountability. Although existing studies remark that this aspect of the rela-
tionship between legal pluralism and human rights is highly relevant (ICHRP 
2009: 32; UN Women 2011), so far this issue has remained under-researched. 
 3. EMPIRICAL LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE PRACTICE 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 In the previous section, the analysis of legal pluralism as social phenom-
enon served as the basis for the evaluation of how human rights law should 
address these realities. By contrast, in this sub-section questions centre 
around understanding how human rights norms articulate with other norms 
in the production of legal subjectivities and social change. What is the role 
of human rights in processes of normative transformation ? How are experi-
ences and representations of grievance, entitlement and duty infl uenced by 
ideas of human rights ? To what extent are these ideas informed by multi-
ple normative repertoires ? Which factors infl uence this and what are their 
consequences ? 
 These questions have been dealt with at length by Merry in her eth-
nography of the transnational production of violence against women as a 
violation of human rights (Merry 2006a,b). She has traced human rights 
approaches to gender violence from the sites in which legal documents and 
policies are formulated to those in which they are supposed to have effects. 
This revealed the key role played by intermediaries, such as community 
leaders, non-governmental organisations, and social movement activists, in 
generating variation in the meaning of human rights. As she explains, the 
logic that underpins transnational human rights does not always resonate 
with local ways of thinking and interpreting the world. Therefore, these 
intermediaries, who are acquainted with both systems of knowledge, trans-
late  ‘ up ’ and  ‘ down ’ . In order to attract international attention and funding, 
they articulate local grievances in the language of human rights. At the same 
time, they reframe human rights in terms that make them  ‘ speak ’ to local 
concerns. Merry calls this process of downwards translation  ‘ vernacularisa-
tion ’ . 20 Against this backdrop, Eckert et al have argued that it is necessary 
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In the latter, the transnational idea merges with local ideas and gets a more interactive form. 
An extreme form of hybridisation is  ‘ subversion ’ in which the name of the transnational idea 
(human rights) is kept but applied to what are fundamentally local ideas. 
to look beyond the role of professional translators (Eckert et al 2012: 10). 
Subjects of law also make meaning of human rights norms and thus extend 
the chain of translation. Moreover, their concerns are not uniform. There-
fore, Eckert et al suggest processes of normative transformation should be 
studied through the notion of  ‘ iteration ’ (ibid). Iterations entail interactions 
in which norms are interpreted. These processes do not involve the meet-
ing and mixing of normative orders but rather subsuming certain concerns 
under varying interpretations of specifi c norms. This goes hand in hand 
with contestations over the meaning of norms and the validity of differ-
ent interpretations thereof, which may be fuelled by knowledge of different 
normative orders. As a result, iterations need to be understood in terms of 
social struggles (ibid). 
 In  chapter 8 , Henquinet provides good illustrations of the reach and lim-
its of normative transformations facilitated by human rights development 
projects in which the meaning of human rights was informed by religious 
normative orders. She shows how the scope and success of the women ’ s 
rights interventions of CARE and UNICEF in Niger were heavily infl uenced 
by religious norms used to interpret women ’ s rights. These prevailed over 
 ‘ global ’ interpretations of those rights due to the power of religious net-
works. Religious norms supported the improvement of women ’ s position in 
public spheres, such as politics and education, but rejected ideas of gender 
equality in private relations, such as those addressed by sexual and repro-
ductive rights. 
 Chapter 7 by Hellum and Katsande and  chapter 10 by Lecoyer suggest 
that knowledge of various normative orders constitutes a crucial factor 
allowing disadvantaged groups to contest the meaning of norms and rede-
fi ne them in ways that respond to their experiences and stakes. Drawing on 
the case of inheritance rights in Zimbabwe, Hellum and Katsande elucidate 
how legal literacy and advice rooted in a plural conception of law enabled 
women to challenge patriarchal norms and discourses on inheritance oper-
ating at different levels. Lecoyer makes the same point when she argues 
that strategies seeking to improve Belgian Muslim women ’ s equal access to 
divorce need to engage with all the normative frameworks at play, ie human 
rights, state law and religious normative discourses. 
 At the same time, the adoption of a rights-defi ned subjectivity depends on 
individuals ’ experiences with mobilising law (Merry 2006a). In  chapter 11 , 
Truffi n and Struelens show that state policies that ignore normative diversity 
may undermine young people ’ s rights consciousness, and their enjoyment 
of the right to family life. Their examination of the experiences of Bel-
gian families with Congolese roots resorting to state law for the resolution 
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of family confl icts points to a plurality of family models (ie egalitarian and 
hierarchical) operating both within these families and within state law. They 
argue that in this context of  ‘ inter-normativity ’ , the protection of the right to 
family life and the provision of adequate support for young people requires 
that state policies deconstruct these contradictions in order to understand 
how they fuel family confl icts in the fi rst place. 
 Finally,  chapter 9 by Buerger demonstrates that strategic resort to custom-
ary norms within a human rights campaign conducted in Ghana increased 
the chances of achieving the campaign ’ s goal, while at the same time under-
mining the acceptability of using the human rights label. Her chapter illus-
trates how different actors contest and police the boundaries of social action 
that can be carried out in the name of human rights. 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE AND NORMATIVE LEGAL PLURALISM 
 To what extent are polices on legal pluralism infl uenced by human rights 
ideas ? How do these policies in turn affect people ’ s experiences with human 
rights ? The interface between the practice of human rights and policies on 
legal pluralism is a relatively recent area of study. Nevertheless, a growing 
body of knowledge is concerned with these questions, particularly in the 
Global South. In several developing regions, neoliberal policies seeking to 
make the state more effi cient have relied on decentralisation and the del-
egation of governance tasks to local actors, such as customary authorities 
(Buur and Kyed 2006; Zips and Weilenmann 2011). This has often led to 
reforms in the legal frameworks dealing with customary law institutions. At 
the same time, in recent years, legal development interventions supported 
by transnational aid organisations have been criticised for their exclusive 
focus on the state (Derman et al 2013; Harper 2011; Tamanaha 2012). 
Recognising that most development regions are characterised by legal 
 pluralism, these organisations increasingly engage with non-state legal orders 
(eg Dfi D 2004; Danida 2010). These agencies ’ adoption of human-rights-based 
approaches to development has resulted in interventions to promote human 
rights at the level of non-state law. In this context, studies have examined 
how existing policies on legal pluralism interplay with these initiatives. They 
show that normative frameworks for legal pluralism tend to defi ne which 
non-state actors and layers of law are included or excluded from these inter-
ventions (Brems et al 2015; Corradi 2014). 
 In  chapter 8 , Henquinet shows that policies on legal pluralism that grant 
offi cial status to discriminatory religious laws may obstruct initiatives to 
debate and redefi ne these laws at more grassroots levels. In  chapter 7 , Hel-
lum and Katsande indicate that even when gender equality clauses are in 
place and apply to non-state law, individuals may be unable to mobilise 
them effectively. They identify lack of knowledge and social pressure as 
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 21  See also the recent decision of the Constitutional Court of Ecuador in the  La Cocha case, 
which excludes murder from the jurisdiction of indigenous justice. Sentence 113-14-SEP-CC, 
30 July 2014. 
powerful constraints for women, limiting the effectiveness of these policies 
on the ground. In  chapter 5 , Hoekema refl ects on the positive aspects of non-
implementing these clauses. He argues that representations of indigenous 
justice as inherently at odds with human rights has often led to policies that 
restrict its jurisdiction. 21 He is particularly critical of policies that demand 
the compliance of non-state legal orders with international standards with-
out requiring the adoption of an intercultural approach to the interpretation 
of these standards. According to him, such policies render human rights 
into an arrogant discourse that justifi es the oppression of the legal insti-
tutions and practices of marginalised groups. Drawing on examples from 
Peru, he shows that in practice, local actors may decide to put these policies 
aside. He concludes that the way in which state and indigenous authorities 
articulate with each other in practice counterbalances the ethnocentric bias 
of these policies, and opens spaces for bottom-up approaches to the cross-
cultural understanding of human rights. 
 In  chapters 10 and 11, Lecoyer and Truffi n and Struelens demonstrate 
that these debates are also relevant in the Global North. In  chapter 10 , 
Lecoyer refl ects on how popular sentiments that reject legal pluralism  ‘ at 
home ’ in the name of human rights lead to a narrow focus on state law as 
the only means to promote Belgian Muslim women ’ s rights. This diverts 
policy-makers ’ attention from other non-legal strategies that may be more 
appropriate in supporting these women and which require engagement with 
religious normative discourses. Similarly,  chapter 11 by Truffi n and Strue-
lens suggests that state policies that ignore or essentialise the role of cultural 
diversity within different layers of law fuel confl icts within families, and 
undermine social cohesion. 
 5. THE CONTRIBUTIONS IN THIS BOOK 
 The insights emerging from most of the chapters in this book may be situ-
ated within one or more of the sub-fi elds sketched out above. Nevertheless, 
the contributions in part 1 can be said to advance arguments that are mainly 
of a normative nature, whereas part 2 is primarily concerned with empirical 
fi ndings. 
 Part 1 opens with a chapter by Brems, in which she analyses the incon-
sistent treatment of legal pluralism by human rights law as a whole. Brems 
remarks that one layer of human rights law, ie the regime governing the 
rights of indigenous peoples, mandates state recognition of legal pluralism, 
whereas another layer, ie the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, forbids it as a violation of human rights. After examining several 
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arguments that may be advanced in order to justify this contradiction, 
Brems concludes that the latter cannot be explained in a coherent man-
ner and shows the negative consequences that follow from it. According to 
Brems, both the privileged treatment of indigenous peoples and the ban on 
legal pluralism endorsed by the European Court are problematic. The for-
mer may be seen as an instance of unjustifi ed discrimination against other 
groups that may have similar grounds to claim the recognition of their legal 
institutions. The latter ignores the potential of policies that recognise legal 
pluralism to foster the protection of human rights, eg by regulating the 
operation of non-state legal orders. Drawing on the case of legal pluralism, 
Brems demonstrates that the pluralist nature of human rights law may lead 
to incongruities that undermine the coherent protection of human rights as 
a whole. She concludes that in order to counter this, it is necessary to look 
at human rights law from an integrated perspective, and identify gaps, areas 
of divergence and alignment, as well as cross-cutting and isolated dynamics. 
 In  chapter 3 , Desmet deals with the relationship between international 
human rights law and legal pluralism at two levels. First, she refl ects on the 
analytical purchase of the concept  ‘ legal pluralism ’ when applied to ever-
smaller bodies of law, such as international human rights law itself. She 
proposes a distinction between  ‘ legal pluralism ’ , as referring to the simul-
taneous applicability of various normative systems in a same social fi eld, 
and  ‘ adopting a legal pluralist perspective ’ to the study of the simultaneous 
applicability of norms originating from the same normative (sub)system. 
In the second part of the chapter, Desmet turns to the relationship between 
human rights law and other normative orders that are applicable in the same 
fi eld. She distinguishes two main possible scenarios. In the fi rst one, human 
rights law and another normative order stand in opposition to each other 
as regards a particular issue, and hence human rights law may be invoked 
against the rules of the normative order that violates human rights. In the 
second one, human rights law and another normative order are aligned on a 
particular theme, defending similar values, interests or entitlements. In this 
case, human rights law may be invoked to reinforce the rules of that other 
normative order. Desmet ’ s analysis of how indigenous legal orders have 
infl uenced the emergence and implementation of human rights standards in 
the domain of indigenous land, territorial and resource rights, demonstrates 
that in practice, both scenarios may occur at the same time. Despite the 
apparent alliance between human rights and indigenous law in this area, the 
overlap is only partial. Indigenous legal orders tend to see nature in a holis-
tic and spiritual way, whereas human rights law refl ects an anthropocentric 
understanding of the connection between men and the environment. Based 
on this, Desmet challenges any unidimensional characterisation of the rela-
tionship between human rights law and other normative orders, even within 
a particular domain. She argues instead for a nuanced assessment that does 
justice to what is actually a multifaceted relationship. 
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 In  chapter 4 , Gomez Isa discusses in detail how this multifaceted relation-
ship played out in one particular case brought by indigenous peoples before 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, ie the famous  Awas Tingni 
case (2001). He describes how in the mid-1990s, a poor indigenous com-
munity of the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua resorted to the Inter-American 
system of human rights. They denounced the timber exploitation conces-
sion which the government of Nicaragua had granted to a transnational 
company in their territory without their consent. In this case, human rights 
law was mobilised by indigenous peoples in alliance with renowned experts 
and donors from North America, seeking a novel interpretation of Article 
21 of the American Convention, which protects the right to property, as 
including indigenous communal property. The Inter-American Court ruled 
in favour of the petitioners and identifi ed indigenous traditional practices 
and customs as the foundation for expanding the scope of this right. This 
not only implied a fl exible interpretation of human rights standards, but 
also a reconfi guration of indigenous peoples ’ relationships with space. In 
the community ’ s understanding, the territory was characterised by porous 
and fl uctuating borders. This stood in contrast with the demand of clear 
demarcation underpinning the court ’ s view of the right to property and the 
mechanisms envisaged to protect it. Despite this tension, Gomez Isa con-
cludes that the  Awas Tingni case constitutes an instance of intercultural 
dialogue, in which indigenous law informed an inclusive reinterpretation 
of human rights. An ensuing question is whether this has led to changes in 
indigenous norms and practices regarding the territory. 
 In  chapter 5 , Hoekema brings the refl ection on the intercultural inter-
pretation of standards to the national level. He focuses on how interna-
tional standards are understood within legal pluralism policies embodied in 
what he calls  ‘ internal confl ict rules ’ , ie national legislation and/or case law 
stipulating the competence of the different legal orders recognised within a 
state, and which determine how to solve confl icts between them. One such 
instance of confl ict may emerge when one of these legal orders violates the 
human rights protected by the state. Hoekema takes issue with policies that 
demand compliance with international standards without adopting an inter-
cultural approach. According to him, such policies may result in Eurocen-
tric human rights discourses that justify the criminalisation of marginalised 
groups. Hoekema examines how internal confl ict rules took shape and were 
applied in concrete cases in which physical punishments were administered 
by indigenous justice. These examples from Colombia, Guatemala and Peru 
illustrate how internal confl ict rules may refl ect an intercultural interpreta-
tion of the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. His conclusion suggests that policies on 
legal pluralism, and in particular their rules on human rights, constitute a 
double-edged sword. Depending on how human rights are understood within 
these policies, they may serve to perpetuate the oppression of marginalised 
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groups, or they may lead to processes of interlegality, in which inclusive 
defi nitions on human rights may emerge. 
 Chapter 6 by Corradi explores precisely this question, but regarding the 
right to a fair trial. Her chapter discusses the complexities involved in the 
cross-cultural assessment of whether indigenous procedural norms comply 
with this right. Based on a case study conducted in Bolivia, she shows that 
different modes of dispute processing rooted in different forms of social 
organisation infl uence how arbitrariness and abuses of power may mani-
fest at the procedural level, and hence which standards of fair trial may be 
applicable to prevent this. Her analysis indicates that factors such as the 
aim of the disputing process, and the role of third parties therein, interplay 
with the relevance and appropriate interpretation of certain elements of this 
right in different disputing contexts. She also identifi es areas of tension and 
overlap, and refl ects on how policies on legal pluralism may address them. 
Since indigenous justice operates in a context of interlegality, it is necessary 
to construct spaces for collaborative interaction between authorities repre-
senting different legal orders, in which various normative and epistemologi-
cal frameworks can be combined in the treatment of cases, particularly at 
grass-roots level. 
 Part 2 opens with  chapter 7 , in which Hellum and Katsande examine the 
gendered dynamics of justice sector initiatives seeking to advance human 
rights through a legally plural framework. They present two longitudinal 
case studies from South Africa and Zimbabwe in which individual women 
and women ’ s rights organisations undertook legal advocacy, legal literacy 
and legal aid in order to mediate the tension between the principle of gender 
equality and the plurality of legal orders that regulate women ’ s lives. The 
study on South Africa investigates how the right to equality embedded in 
CEDAW, the South African Constitution and the Land Restitution Act was 
implemented by state and non-state actors involved in different phases of the 
land restitution process in the Limpopo Province. The study shows that the 
spaces of operation of human rights organisations opened and then closed 
in the political shift from a social-justice-based to a market-based land res-
titution policy. The former allowed human rights organisations to address 
power structures within communities, and hence gender relations, whereas 
the latter saw this as a private matter and foreclosed this possibility. The 
study on Zimbabwe analyses the work of two women ’ s rights organisations 
in the area of equal inheritance rights. It shows how the breakdown of the 
rule of law and the politicisation of customary authorities led to situations 
of legal impunity that curtailed women ’ s options to negotiate their property 
rights. Both case studies demonstrate that different paradigms of govern-
ance, rooted in changing political and economic terrains, affect the bargain-
ing power of individual women and women ’ s rights organisations seeking 
gender justice. In both cases, the success of the interventions depended 
not only on these organisations ’ ability to develop situational and locally 
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appropriate strategies of argumentation, but also on the broader political, 
legal and economic power structures in which they operated. 
 In  chapter 8 , Henquinet illustrates this further. She explains how two 
transnational aid organisations active in Niger, CARE and UNICEF, nego-
tiate the meaning of women ’ s rights and the scope of their interventions 
within semi-autonomous social fi elds. These fi elds are impacted by compet-
ing women ’ s rights discourses endorsed by national legislation and popular 
religious views of Islam. The context in which these organisations work is 
characterised by neoliberal policies and the retreat of the state from mar-
kets, governance and services. In addition, there is a strong presence of 
ideas of male guardianship and provision, internalised through popular dis-
courses on Islamic jurisprudence. Henquinet shows that in this setting, the 
process of implementing equality based notions of women ’ s rights is resisted 
by drawing on other rights discourses that are rooted in Nigeriens ’ identi-
ties as Muslims. As a result, ideas of equality and independence are set aside 
in exchange for a discourse that emphasises the improvement of women ’ s 
status in communal relations, without challenging women ’ s subordinate 
position in the family. This results in the success of certain women ’ s rights 
interventions, such as the Quota Law increasing the number of women in 
public spaces. But at the same time, it leads to the rejection of initiatives 
to reform family law, the persistence of reservations to CEDAW and the 
reformulation of programmes on the ground to conform to popular notions 
of the family that reproduce gender inequalities in the private sphere. Hen-
quinet concludes that in Niger, women ’ s rights are largely conceived outside 
the realm of global discourses on the liberal subject due to the complex 
interplay of policies on legal pluralism, a weak state and the prominence of 
religious networks. 
 Chapter 9 by Buerger turns towards the examination of how a plural-
ity of norms may be used strategically by actors that decide to mobilise in 
the name of human rights. She discusses the case of a human rights advo-
cacy campaign conducted by two contiguous low-income communities in 
Accra, Ghana, which sought the improvement of the drainage stream that 
divided them. The latter had been historically neglected, leading to serious 
problems of health and sanitation. Her study illustrates how the plurality 
of legal orders that characterised the milieu of this human rights campaign 
infl uenced the strategies pursued, and how the meaning of human rights was 
contested in the process. In the course of their advocacy, some members of 
the youth club involved in the campaign combined a human rights discourse 
on health and sanitation with patriarchal notions of community obligation 
embedded in custom. While this increased the number of social networks 
of which they could make claims, it also raised important questions about 
what methods were considered acceptable for claiming rights, what values 
fi tted under  ‘ a human rights approach ’ , and who had the capacity to decide. 
Buerger demonstrates that human rights mobilisation outside the strictly 
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regulated spaces of courtrooms allows for the negotiation of the boundaries 
of different legal orders, including human rights, making them fl exible and 
unstable. She defi nes these spaces as  ‘ legal borderlands ’ , highlighting not 
only the porousness of the borders between coexisting legal orders, but also 
the way in which individual actors attempt to reshape them for strategic 
purposes. 
 Strategic use of different layers of law, and the structures that limit differ-
ent actors ’ options with it, is at the core of  chapter 10 by Lecoyer. She analy-
ses the women ’ s rights implications of the de facto coexistence of state law 
and a multiplicity of Islamic discourses regulating the divorce practices of 
Muslim families in Belgium. Lecoyer explores how state law and global as 
well as local Islamic normative discourses available to Belgian Muslim fami-
lies infl uence women ’ s strategies and experiences with divorce, and affect 
their legal consciousness. She shows that these discourses are heterogene-
ous and subject to reinterpretation. Nevertheless, they remain controlled 
by male religious scholars, who stay largely insensitive to the need to adapt 
these discourses to the realities of women and contemporary life in a secu-
lar context. In exploring women ’ s strategies and experiences with divorce, 
she shows that besides the options and limits offered by these discourses, 
other factors enable and constrain women ’ s agency. Having access to several 
options for marriage dissolution enhances women ’ s ability to pursue their 
interests, as does the support of the social and family networks of which 
they are part. Conversely, social pressure rooted in patriarchal views of gen-
der relations appears as the main obstacle to divorce. In this context, some 
women will refrain from challenging discriminatory practices due to fear of 
the stigma that is associated with making a marital dispute public in court. 
Against this backdrop, Lecoyer argues that human rights strategies aiming 
at enhancing the position of these women need to marry the right to equality 
and religion. Instead of adopting legislation seeking to regulate the plurality 
of norms at play, these strategies need to enhance Muslim women ’ s aware-
ness of their rights under all the normative frameworks that apply to them, 
and their capacity to (re)defi ne them. 
 Also concerned with individual ’ s experiences with plural law, the last 
chapter by Truffi n and Struelens interrogates the concept of interlegality. 
They focus on intra-family confl icts involving members of Congolese fami-
lies and families of Congolese descent living in Belgium. They analyse two 
typical confl ictual situations that individuals from these families face in their 
adolescence and adulthood: intergenerational tension between youths and 
their parents, and contradictory models of conjugal relationships produced 
by diverse fi elds of state law affecting couples with a migratory background. 
By adopting an actor perspective, their study shows that egalitarian and hier-
archical models of the family are at play both within families and at the level 
of state law. As a result, it is not possible to allocate either model to a single 
normative order. Truffi n and Struelens depict these complex confi gurations 
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of normative plurality by the concept of  ‘ inter-normativity ’ , ie a diversity 
of references and models entwined in a source of norms. The narratives of 
young people and spouses examined by Truffi n and Struelens uncover the 
tensions, ruptures and continuities that result from family relationships 
being reproduced in private and public spheres that are characterised by 
internormativity. In their conclusion, they refl ect on the implications of 
these fi ndings, and in particular what they mean in terms of enhancing the 
protection of the right to family life. On the one hand, they argue that ste-
reotypes attributing an egalitarian vision of the family to the public sphere 
and a hierarchical one to the  ‘ Congolese community ’ lie at the root of the 
lack of responsiveness of state institutions towards the realities of these 
families. On the other hand, they question migratory regulations that affect 
the economy of relationship inside transnational families by granting some 
members a status on which others depend. As their data indicates, these 
regulations fuel confl icts within families, which are too high a cost for social 
cohesion in comparison with the benefi ts of controlling migration fl ows. 
 Overall, the essays in this collection constitute an invitation to continue to 
think critically about the multiple interfaces between human rights and legal 
pluralism. At the crossroads of all contributions is a concern with under-
standing how human rights may become vehicles for social justice. 
 
 
